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Abstract 
This work is an attempt to show how the U.S covertly meddled into 
the Nigeria-Biafra War despite her much taunted ‘neutrality’ in the 
conflict. No doubt, the U.S did not grant any official arms sales to 
either Nigeria or the secessionist Biafra, and regarded the war as 
‘internal conflict’ that should be resolved internally. Many a 
literature on the Nigeria-Biafra conflict had taken this to absolve U.S 
of any form of active political involvement in the thirty months war. 
However, a critical survey of policy actions and activities of the U.S 
State Department via its Embassy in Lagos and U.S multinational 
private companies in Nigeria during the war respectively, casts 
serious doubts on the propriety and correctness of the U.S neutrality 
in the conflict. Using the ‘linkage politics’ understanding of foreign 
policy as the most relevant conceptual framework of analysis, and 
hugely relying on secondary sources of information with available 
declassified document, the paper argues that the U.S was partisan, 
and indirectly supported Nigeria as against Biafra. Therefore, it 
belies, and refuses the contention that ‘U.S did not get politically 
involved and maintained neutrality throughout the conflict’. 
Keywords: Neutrality, War, Internal conflict, Involvement, and 
Foreign policy  
Introduction 
Unarguably, the Nigeria-Biafra War, on the external front, cropped 
up a number of vested interests: some political and material in 
nature, others psychological and morally humanitarian. It is pertinent 
to point out that the U.S was one of the major poles in the vortex of 
this interplay of interests, and as such preoccupied our focus here. 
Ogene (1983) posits, thus:  
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The issue of Nigeria-Biafra conflict in the U.S was 
both political and humanitarian: the political 
concerned the problem whether the U.S should 
support a ‘united Nigeria’ or the secessionist Biafra 
while the humanitarian argued whether a clear 
distinction between the political and relief issues 
could be made. Should the U.S exert all possible 
effort to help relieve the millions of refugees in 
Biafra dying from starvation? Should it subscribe to 
the British and Nigerian government opinion that 
relief question could not be separated from politics; 
that starvation was a legitimate weapon of warfare; 
and that U.S should, therefore, not make any relief 
effort that was not approved by the British and 
Nigerian government. 
 
As the outbreak of the war produced realities that are political and 
humanitarian, the U.S was caught in the challenge of an 
unambiguous policy preference. 
Although the U.S had taken a political stance of playing 
neutrality in the conflict, there was no clear and coherent policy 
guideline to that effect. As Stremlau (1986) would argue, ‘the U.S 
government vacillated on a common policy on the Nigerian Civil 
War’. This, the State Department, a key agency in shaping external 
policies of the U.S government, as a consequence, saw as a superior 
advantage to pursue what it thought about as U.S national interest in 
the face of the conflict the way it deemed fit. Hence, any policy 
actions or inactions of this agency inter alia were regarded as having 
originated from the U.S government. 
 From the outset, the U.S proclaimed the Nigerian Civil War 
an internal conflict, thus, pretended her non-involvement. Dean 
Rusk, the then U.S Secretary of State, stated that Nigeria was a 
‘British baby’ thus saw no justification for America’s political 
involvement where he deemed fit British sphere of influence 
remained preponderant (Ohaegbulam, 2012:132). It is important to 
note that though the U.S refrained from direct sale of arms to either 
of the parties in the conflict, she never hide her belief in ‘one united 
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Nigeria’. Forsyth (1978:236) posits that the U.S, guided by the dead 
hand of State Department, was steadfast in her belief in, and support 
for, ‘one Nigeria’ regardless of the cost of lives taken up by the war. 
Thus, American government ensured her tacit support for the 
Nigerian side in the conflict. 
Perhaps, the U.S position on ‘one indivisible Nigeria’ was 
largely dictated by political and material interest. Many a scholar 
agree that the State Department in collaboration of the U.S Embassy 
in Nigeria often tried to state U.S national interest in the face of the 
protracted conflict in terms of protecting the lives and property 
investments of U.S nationals (Sklar, 1980; Okpoko, 1986; and 
Cronje, 1983). The U.S saw the size of a united Nigeria as a big 
external market; hence, her growing investment drive and volume of 
trade in an emerging commercial empire like Nigeria was crucial. As 
Ogene (1983) further states: 
At the last count, before the civil war broke out, 
there were at least 85 American firms of different 
sizes with business concerns in Nigeria. The total 
U.S private investments stood at about $800 million 
of which $ 100 million is acquired by Gulf Oil and 
$50 million by Mobil Oil Corporation. The main 
private investments in the Eastern parts, that were 
later to secede as Biafra, were made by Mobil, 
Texaco, and Indian Textile Mills which had a 
multimillion dollar plant in Aba. 
In other words, U.S had gained a sort of growing robust economic 
presence in the Nigerian economy before the fall of Civil War in 
1967. 
Although American private companies in Nigeria initially 
appeared neutral and non-committal on the conflict, ceaseless 
pressure from the State Department in Washington and U.S Embassy 
in Lagos, coupled with damaging business prospects, made them to 
graciously buy in the ‘thinking’ of these two U.S government 
agencies. The thinking implied that the Nigerian government is the 
recognized legitimate entity in the conflict and should be 
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‘justifiably’ supported in her efforts to ensure military victory as 
short a time as possible against Biafra. And, if this faith is kept, the 
end of the war would guarantee more economic prospects and 
security for American companies in Nigeria. Therefore, the 
centrality of this study is to show how the policy actions and 
inactions of the State Department, in collaboration with the U.S 
Embassy in Lagos, influenced the attitude of U.S private 
multinational companies in Nigeria to support the Nigerian side, and 
brought the U.S on the strand of partisan involvement despite her 
proclaimed neutrality in the conflict. In this context, the explanation 
of ‘neutrality in conflict; the actual position of U.S government on 
the conflict; and the rationale for the involvement and support of U.S 
private big businesses for Nigeria are imperatively captured. 
 
‘Neutrality’ Defined 
The word ‘neutrality’ literally suggests ‘impartiality’ or ‘not taking 
sides’ in a dispute or over a contentious issue. However, as simple as 
it appears, neutrality is technical in its definition. As a practice 
among states in international system, it can be approached from two 
different perspectives that are not mutually exclusive. Wesler 
(2001:217) notes that the concept of neutrality may mean ‘a political 
doctrine’ for states, or a how state, non-committal, reacts to a given 
conflict. Thus, Umozuruike (2005:55) asserts: 
Neutrality as a political doctrine means a policy of 
non-alignment with any of the big power blocs as a 
matter of policy. It means non-involvement in the 
quarrels of the big Powers or in their Cold War 
conflict. On the other hand, neutrality in a conflict 
means the actions or inactions of a state not taking 
sides in a given conflict outside its borders. It is that 
which a state is bound to observe in regard to a 
conflict in which it is not a party and does not wish 
to be. 
 
In other words, neutrality implies ‘non-involvement’ and, to some 
degree, ‘non-intervention’. As a matter of operational understanding, 
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neutrality in this study is seen from the perspective of ‘neutrality in a 
conflict’. ‘Neutrality’, according to Northedge and Donelan 
(2002:118), ‘is when a state does not seek to influence the course of 
a dispute outside its shores by words or actions’. Thus, it does 
amount to not taking sides in a given conflict. However, neutrality in 
a conflict does not mean passiveness in international affairs but 
rather taking stand on issues based on the merits of the case. State 
may be neutral in a given conflict and still intervene in it. Here, it 
becomes a strategic guise to a state response to developments of 
interest in her external environment. Thus, to Telleyrand (1990:106), 
‘non-intervention is a metaphysical and political phrase meaning 
about the same as intervention’.   
 
Conceptual Framework 
To better understand the dialectics of this discourse, the premise of 
‘linkage politics’ of foreign policy analysis is crucial. The central 
idea is that state missions, nationals and their ownerships abroad are 
an indispensible extension of the entity of their home state in their 
host states; thus, the home state and its extensions abroad are 
inextricably linked in a chain of predictable but oftentimes 
unannounced relationship. Weber and Smith (2002:164) note that 
the individual interest and material pursuit of nationals abroad are 
always done in line with the prevailing national interest and 
ideological strand of their parent nations. That is to say that there is a 
common ‘ground of convergence’ in the views, interests, and 
dispositions of nationals abroad and their home government, 
especially as those impinge on the countries of their host. No matter 
the weight of regulations and laws existing within the borders of the 
host state, nationals abroad often seek to gratify their individual and 
group interest in a way to reinforce the primary objectives of their 
parent nations. 
Morgenthau (2001) argues that the manner with which these 
interests and policy behaviour are interlinked and pursued is a matter 
of ‘advantage’ and ‘strategy’ at the disposal of both the parent and 
host nations, and could mar or make the sovereign political existence 
of either of them or both. Thus, for the goals of a state to be achieved 
in this light, the state must be preponderant and powerful in the 
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power calculations of the state playing host to it. In other words, its 
foreign missions, companies, and citizens in its host country must be 
credible and effective enough to defend its goals at all time. 
Richardson (2006:130) states that the personality components of a 
country’s nationals abroad include: foreign missions, business 
investments, organized civil society groups and non-governmental 
organizations, and private citizens with voluntary resident status, 
amongst others. He further states that in the contemporary these 
components are a conduit through which powerful states carry out 
their foreign policy objectives in other states. In this garb, the place 
of the U.S Embassy and private business giants in the Nigerian Civil 
War could be better understood. 
As a matter of relevance, the U.S government at the 
outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War declared its neutrality in the 
conflict. But for some obvious reasons, perhaps, supported the 
British-led position of ‘one united Nigeria’; thus, regarded the 
Nigerian government as the ‘legitimate’ party to the conflict. This 
position, the State Department pushed, via the U.S Embassy in 
Lagos, beyond mere policy statement with relentless vigor. It never 
ceased persuading the U.S big business in Nigeria to actively 
support the Nigerian side. As private investments and the political 
agencies representing the authority of their parent countries in their 
host countries are intricately interlinked, the U.S private 
conglomerates could not refuse the directives and steady persuasions 
from an agency holding for their parent government; thus, threw 
their support to Nigeria as against Biafra. Hence, the U.S neutrality 
in the war was a mere strategic rhetoric. 
 
The U.S.A. Government and the Nigeria-Biafra War 
When the war broke out in 1967, the U.S government under 
President Lyndon B. Johnson officially announced its neutrality and 
non-political involvement, and regarded the war as ‘internal 
conflict’; thus, did not quality America’s active involvement. 
Washington regarded Nigeria as a bastion of British influence. It is 
noted that President Johnson, in his usual style, showed little interest 
in Nigeria, and gave the career officials in the State Department a 
freehand in policy making on Africa (Akinyemi 1996). As a 
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consequence, this policy inaction on the part of White House created 
a big room for the ‘sympathy-for-Nigeria’ careerists in the State 
Department and the U.S Embassy in Nigeria which they saw as a 
huge advantage. In collaboration with these two key agencies, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph Palmer, 
formulated and conducted U.S policy on the Nigerian Civil War 
with less influence from White House and the Congress. That is to 
say that predominating influence of these agencies, perhaps, resulted 
from the White House failure to suggest a practicable policy 
guideline. 
The State Department and the U.S Embassy in Lagos tried to 
state the U.S policy on the conflict in the light of political and 
material interest rather than moral and humanitarian imperatives. 
Currey (2002:189) argues, thus: 
The gist of the State Department attitude was that… 
respect for the preferences and sensitivities of the 
British and Nigerian Governments on the war 
should be given priority over the need for relief. 
This meant that the U.S should support the positions 
taken by Britain and Nigeria, and that the U.S be 
committed to the principle of ‘one Nigeria’ and 
opposed to the secession of Biafra. This meant, too, 
that the U.S, while leaving the supply of arms to 
Nigeria in the hands of Britain, should give political 
and diplomatic assistance possible to achieve the 
aims of Britain, her ally. 
 
Thus, the insistence of the State Department on the British position 
that relief issues should not be separated from the politics of the 
conflict, and that the U.S should participate in humanitarian relief 
only to the extent and in such way as the Nigerian government 
approved could be better understood in this context. Okpoko 
(1986:55) observes: 
Although the U.S relief to Nigeria did, in fact, begin 
in March 1968 when President Johnson authorized 
USAID to ship worth of P.L 480 food to Lagos, the 
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efforts were stalled by the officials in the State 
Department in Washington and U.S Embassy in 
Lagos. For instance, when Johnson sent Mr. Palmer 
to confer with the ICRC officials in Geneva on how 
to extend relief to Nigeria, the officials in State 
Department did not support the idea for an 
emergency airlift into Biafra. The argument being 
that American government would run into severe 
logistical problems… Even, when they grudgingly 
agreed to, they maintained that the only feasible 
alternative was a land route into Biafra where the 
Nigerian forces could supervise the process. 
 
Nevertheless, critics are aware that what was the truth about the 
situation was: first, the Nigerian government resistance to an airlift 
of relief into Biafra, and not the logistics as advanced by the State 
Department. For instance, Senator McGovern, Democrat from South 
Dakota, pointed out that ‘if America could find the logistical skill to 
drop weapons in Vietnam, why the logistic problem for relief airlift 
into Biafra’ (Nwankwo, 1980).  Secondly, the State Department and 
the U.S Embassy in Nigeria held strong belief that ‘one Nigeria’ had 
to be preserved at all cost, and the humane way of ending the 
starvation was for Lagos to effect ‘quick kill’; thus, large scale relief 
prior to a Biafran surrender was self-defeating and would prolong 
the war. Larry Pepple, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an 
interview, confirmed that the U.S Ambassador to Nigeria, Elbert G. 
Mathews, on several occasions appealed to Washington to rescind its 
decision and grant sale of arms to Nigeria is intensify her war efforts 
against Biafra. Though, these appeals were not granted, it tells the 
length the Embassy in Lagos could go to ensure victory for the 
Nigerian side. 
In another related account, Hyacinth Akuma, at the 
Nigeria’s Foreign Service Desk, recalled that in 1968 Mr. Palmer 
made several trips to Europe and Africa canvassing for support for 
U.S.A. policies on the political and relief issues in the Nigeria-Biafra 
War. James Kwadoh of WestAfrican Pilot reported, thus: 
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Mr. Palmer tried to close up any European sources 
through which Biafra might buy arms on the black 
market. He also tried hard to persuade France not to 
allow arms deliveries to Biafra. Apart from being a 
regular visitor to many Heads of State in Africa 
before OAU meetings, Mr. Palmer succeeded in 
making the Cameroun government to close its 
border to any activities connected with the Nigerian 
Civil War; thus, denying Biafra the most logical 
airstrips for flying in relief. 
 
Therefore, one could see the substance in Biafra’s claim that Mr. 
Palmer and Britain used their agents to sabotage the transportation of 
relief and arms to Biafra. 
The State Department and the U.S Embassy in Nigeria, also, 
for obvious material interest, traded the argument that the end of the 
war with victory for Nigeria as short a time as possible would lead to 
gradual and partial lifting of import restrictions, and guarantee more 
robust trade and steady lifting of Nigerian crude oil for the U.S 
multinational giants. In November 1967, U.S Ambassador in Lagos, 
Mr. Mathews, sent a letter to the Nigerian-American Chambers of 
Commerce in Lagos pleading America’s complete support for ‘one 
Nigeria’ (Ezeani, 2013; and Achebe, 2012). Thus, there was intense 
and ceaseless pressure from State Department and U.S Embassy in 
Lagos on the part of U.S business community in Nigeria to support 
the Nigerian side in the conflict. As American big business in 
Nigeria had been making frantic efforts to lobby Washington for a 
policy that would guarantee their economic fortune and security, 
they, unarguably, saw in the policy stance of the State Department 
and the Embassy in Lagos the needed moral justification to support 
the Nigeria’s war efforts against Biafra’s political and material 
survival. 
Nonetheless, President Nixon’s review of U.S policy on the 
Nigeria Civil War in 1969 could not make any significant change. 
Though, the level of American relief supplies to Nigeria through the 
ICRC, USAID, and UNICEF, amongst others doubled, the attitude 
and policy positions of the State Department and the U.S Embassy in 
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Nigeria remained unwavering. Even, the new Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs, David D. Newsom, and new U.S 
Ambassador to Nigeria, William Trueheart, continued the pro-
Nigerian stance of their predecessors (Cronje,1983). 
 
U.S.A. Multinational Companies in the Nigeria-Biafra War 
The role of American business companies in the Nigeria-Biafra war 
cannot be over-emphasized. No doubt, the bourgeoning American 
private capital and its attendant investment drives had made a 
meaningful inroad into the Nigerian economy by the middle of the 
first decade after independence. Olukoshi (1998:28) observes: 
Although, Britain was still dominant in the Nigerian 
political economy, the U.S has made some 
substantial progress in investments in the Nigerian 
economy. She invested in some of the key sectors of 
the Nigerian economy viz: oil, telecommunication, 
textile, agriculture, amongst others. Nigeria was 
playing host to a number of U.S multinationals 
before the outbreak of Civil War in 1967. 
Therefore, U.S saw Nigeria as a huge external market, and a major 
economic power house within the African political geography that 
would be of immense benefit to her economic interest. Some of the 
major U.S multinational companies in Nigeria then include: Gulf 
Oil, Mobil Oil Corporation, Texaco Oil, in the oil sector; 
International Telecommunication Company (ITT), American 
Telephone Company (ATC) in the communication sector; 
Slumberger, RCC, in the building construction; Indian-American 
Textile Mills in Lagos, Aba and Kano; American agro-allied 
industries and processing companies, among others (Oluwole, 2000). 
One thing is dear: at the beginning of the conflict, as earlier 
hinted, these American business companies were neutral. They did 
not make any statements that clearly showed their attitudes and 
policy preferences. In fact, these business conglomerates seemed 
genuinely uninvolved at the start of the war. They had an equal 
chance of being protected by either side-Nigeria or Biafra. For 
instance, foreign oil companies at outset defined their policy as one 
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of paying oil royalties to the government which physically 
controlled their assets. 
However, things changed dramatically as the war dragged 
on. New realities surfaced to throw their neutral business stance over 
board. First, the growing level of war destructions and insecurity of 
lives and property made business prospects very slim, and operations 
risky. Secondly, there were unceasing pressure from State 
Department in Washington and U.S Embassy in Lagos to support 
Nigeria’s war efforts against secessionist Biafra. Bolarinwa 
(2001:104) recalls, thus: 
There were short-run implications for U.S firms and 
exporters. Restrictions on imports by the Nigerian 
government together with falling level of capital 
expenditure hampered business activity… while the 
U.S share of Nigeria’s import in 1966 was 16.2% 
and the U.S enjoyed a surplus in its trade with 
Nigeria, its share of that same import had declined 
to 12.8% in the first quarter of 1968. No new U.S 
investment was coming in, and her investments in 
the war zones were mostly inactive. Only Gulf Oil 
continued to exploit its off-shore oil wells, but not 
without war challenges. 
Thus, the State Department and the officials in U.S Embassy in 
Lagos persuaded the films, especially the oil giants, that the end of 
the conflict would bring a gradual and partial lifting of import 
restrictions, and that the increased export of crude oil and palm 
products from the war zone, when Biafra is defeated, would increase 
the availability of foreign exchange in Nigeria to pay for some long 
postponed imports. The assurance being that Nigerian side would 
win the war with ease, and as in a short time as possible. 
Nonetheless, with opportunities for making profits damaged 
on both sides by the protracted war and with much of plants and 
machinery damaged, destroyed or commandeered by both sides, 
these films have suffered, and still been blamed by both sides. As it 
was in the interest of these companies to exploit, trade, and make 
Onuegbu & Hanson: The role of U.S and her multinational companies… 
249 
 
profit, it was in their utmost interest that the war be short, and 
perhaps, not primarily that Biafra be crushed. Based on the 
foregoing realities, American ‘big business’ in Nigeria not only 
yielded to pressure from the State Department and the Embassy in 
Lagos, but rationalized their political and material support for the 
Nigerian side in the conflict. Yet, one may deem it necessary to 
enquire, ‘how and, in what form, did these ‘multinationals’ show 
this support and defense for the Nigerian side? 
First, until the autumn of 1968, some companies, especially 
oil giants operating in the Biafra zones, paid a token of taxes and oil 
royalties to the Biafra war-time government. However, the new 
stance of these business investments, and their recognition of the 
Nigerian government as the ‘legitimate government’ meant that the 
taxes and oil royalties went to the coffers of the Nigerian 
government. In other words, American oil firms in the Biafra war 
zones became less operational, and stopped paying royalties and 
other kinds of taxes to the Biafra authorities. Thus, it was seen as the 
sole and legitimate responsibility of the Nigerian government. 
Nwankwo (1994:63) notes, thus: 
The refusal of taxes and royalties to Biafra by 
foreign companies for the material benefit of 
Nigeria incapacitated Biafra’s war efforts. It denied 
her the badly needed finances to exchange for arms 
and food supplies in the face of economic blockade 
while, on the other hand, enhanced Nigeria’s effort 
in effecting the ‘quick kill’ of Biafra. 
Therefore, oil royalties and taxes paid to Nigeria, and denied Biafra, 
must have aided Nigeria in prosecuting the war by providing much 
needed foreign exchange. 
Secondly, it was possible that pro-Nigerian U.S companies 
gave material and logistic assistance to Nigerian forces. The Biafra 
intelligence had alleged, in a number of occasion, that the aircraft 
and ships of American private companies were used to transporting 
Nigerian soldiers and equipment to the war fronts. Though, the 
veracity or otherwise of this allegation may not be guaranteed, the 
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fact remains that U.S private companies did subsidize the material 
cost of the war for the Nigerian forces, and this may not be 
unconnected with the ‘burning of headquarters and property of some 
foreign companies in Asaba, accused of aiding the Nigerian side by 
the Biafra soldiers, in April 1968’ (Nwankwo,1994). 
No doubt, American companies became more active in their 
support for Nigeria; many of them maintained lobbies in 
Washington and financed measures intended to consolidate pro-
Nigerian policy positions. Garba (1991) observes that when 
President Nixon never relied on the briefings and routine 
correspondences from the State Department and the Embassy in 
Lagos on matters bordering on the Nigerian Civil War, the U.S 
private firms became the main contacts for the Nigerian government 
to the Nixon administration. It was reported that Mobile Oil 
Corporation sponsored the visits to the U.S of the Nigerian 
Commissioner for Transport and Communications, Mr. Joseph 
Tarka, in September 1968 and March 1969. The 1968 visit was 
scheduled for technical and commercial discussion while the 1969 
visit was to offset the emerging Biafra sentiment (WeatAfrican Pilot, 
Sept., 1969). Declassified post-Nixon Probe Report shows that top 
U.S oil multinationals in Nigeria unduly enticed some senior White 
House officials and Congressmen to ensure a pro-Nigerian policy on 
Nigeria-Biafra conflict, between April 1968 and November 1969 
(U.S Embassy Archives, Abuja). Thus, the U.S private companies’ 
involvement in the politics of Nigerian Civil War reinforced the 
importance of their interest in Nigeria before the U.S foreign policy 
makers. 
What is more, there was what appeared like a deliberate 
design by the U.S private business giants to frustrate organized relief 
and humanitarian assistance to the starving Biafra. Several appeals 
to them, on a moral ground, by concerned civil organizations around 
the world to help underwrite the costs of relief efforts to Nigeria, 
nonetheless, were blatantly disregarded. It was gathered that in one 
of the forums organized in New Hampshire, in December 1968, to 
see how interested American big business could help partner and 
finance humanitarian groups to save the lives of war victims in 
Nigeria, none of the American firms that have economic stake in 
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Nigeria ever showed up.30 Even, when the relief was procured and 
airlifting becomes a difficulty, these conglomerates denied them 
aircrafts and cargo facilities. Perhaps, it might not be unfounded to 
argue that this attitude was demonstrated to show their unflinching 
support for Nigerian side in the war. Thus, the evidence adduced so 
far showed that U.S multinational companies in Nigeria, like the 
officials in State Department and U.S Embassy in Lagos, took a side 
in the Nigeria-Biafra conflict without having a recourse to the 
question of neutrality by supporting the Nigerian side. 
 
Conclusion 
The discussion, in its findings, so far shows that the U.S 
government, contrary to the common view held by many, was 
partisan in the Nigeria-Biafra War despite her earlier proclaimed 
neutrality stance in the conflict. And, this she did through the 
instrumental partisan involvement of, and support for ‘one Nigeria’ 
by, the State Department with her Embassy in Lagos and the private 
multinational companies in Nigeria. Therefore, the U.S government 
actively sided and supported Nigeria in the Nigeria-Biafra conflict. 
Despite how the U.S government tends to deny it, and 
dissociate herself from the policy positions of State Department, her 
Embassy in Lagos, and the private business conglomerates in 
Nigeria, she cannot deny the importance of these ‘linkage 
institutions’ as an integral part of her system. Therefore, any policy 
decisions or actions sanctioned by these institutions are, unarguably, 
the responsibility of U.S government; thus, should be judged to that 
effect in principle and practice. Aside this incontrovertible fact, it is 
important to point out that the State Department and U.S Embassies 
under its directives hold the key to U.S foreign policy formulations 
and implementations. Thus, for any sound judgment to be passed on 
the actual position and role of the U.S in the Nigeria-Biafra conflict, 
it should be rightly done in the context of what constituted policy 
actions and inactions of the State Department and its cohorts, and 
not necessarily on what the White House or the Congress wished, 
said or did. In other words, the much taunted U.S neutrality in the 
Nigerian Civil War largely suffered inherent contradictions and to 
that extent of inconsistency became non practicable. Hence, 
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‘neutrality’, as conceived by the U.S in the face of Nigeria-Biafra 
conflict, could be seen as a tactics to mask, and carry out, her 
ulterior but real agenda, with less or no international provocations 
and condemnation, in a strategic guise. 
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